As we first noted in our list of U.S. Supreme Court Lone Dissents, the period of time spanned by a “term” or session of the Court has varied over the years.
Moreover, there are two different kinds of Court terms: Regular Terms and Special Terms. And then there are what we’ll call Terms of Convenience, which aren’t really terms at all, but simply some isolated examples of cases that existed outside the normal term framework.
Regular Terms
The first Judiciary Act, passed in 1789, required the Supreme Court to hold two sessions (terms) per year, beginning on the first Monday in February and again on the first Monday in August.
Then by Statute passed on February 13, 1801, terms were changed to the first Monday of June and December:
SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in
Congress assembled, That from and after the next session
of the Supreme Court of the United States, the said court
shall be holden by the justices thereof, or any four of
them, at the city of Washington, and shall have two
sessions in each and every year thereafter, to commence
on the first Monday of June and December respectively;
Then by Statute passed on April 29, 1802, terms were changed to the first Monday of February, reducing the number of sessions per year to one:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
from and after the passing of this act, the Supreme Court
of the United States shall be holden by the justices thereof,
or any four of them, at the city of Washington, and shall
have one session in each and every year, to commence on the
first Monday of February annually;
...
And so much of the act, intituled "An act to establish the
judicial courts of the United States," passed the twenty-fourth
day of September, seventeen hundred and eighty-nine, as provides
for the holding a session of the supreme court of the United
States on the first Monday of August, annually, is hereby
repealed.
Then by Statute passed on May 4, 1826, terms were changed to the second Monday of January:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That,
from and after the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-six,
the session of the Supreme Court, heretofore held on the first
Monday of February annually, shall, instead thereof, be held on
the second Monday of January annually;
Then by Statute passed on June 17, 1844, terms were changed to the first Monday of December.
NOTE: Even though this change occurred in 1844, you may notice that the Court continued to call their terms “January” terms, until December 1850 when it finally began referring to them as December terms. This change does not mean there were two terms in 1850, as some would suggest. 1844 was the year there were actually two terms: January Term 1844, and “January Term 1845”, which began in December 1844.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That from and after the passage of this act, the sessions
of the Supreme Court, heretofore commenced and held on the
second Monday of January, annually, shall instead thereof
be commenced and held the first Monday of December, annually;
Then by Statute passed on January 24, 1873, terms were changed to the second Monday of October:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
from and after the passage of this act the annual session of
the Supreme Court of the United States shall commence on the
second Monday of October in each year....
Then by Statute passed on September 6, 1916, terms were changed to the first Monday of October:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
section two hundred and thirty of an Act to codify, revise,
and amend the laws relating to the judiciary, approved March
third, nineteen hundred and eleven, known as the Judicial
Code, be, and it hereby is, amended so as to read as follows:
"SEC. 230. The Supreme Court shall hold at the seat of
government one term annually, commencing on the first Monday
in October, and such adjourned or special terms as it may find
necessary for the dispatch of business."
This final change took effect beginning with October Term 1917.
Special Terms
Ordinarily, we assume that a term ends only once the following term has begun. For example, October Term 1942 began on Monday, October 5, 1942, so logically October Term 1941 would have ended the day before. That certainly seems to be the modern practice, at any rate (see the McConnell case below).
However, in 1942, a special term was created in July, which included arguments on July 29-30 and a decision on July 31. Similar special terms were created in 1953, 1958, and 1972.
It seems likely that sometime after 1972, there was a change in Supreme Court procedures, resulting in the elimination of special terms, but as yet, we’ve not identified the change.
JULY SPECIAL TERM, 1942
JUNE 15 SPECIAL TERM, 1953
JUNE 18 SPECIAL TERM, 1953
AUGUST SPECIAL TERM, 1958
JULY SPECIAL TERM, 1972
Terms of Convenience
The following cases illustrate instances where a special term might have originally been warranted, but the current term was simply used (or extended) instead. The McConnell case, in particular, seems to suggest that the days of special terms are over.
UNITED STATES v. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL. (418 U.S. 683) was argued July 8, 1974, decided July 24, 1974, and reported in U.S. Reports as part of October Term 1973. This makes some sense, because apparently the Court had not yet issued its final 1973 Term opinion until July 8 (see SECRETARY OF THE NAVY v. AVRECH, 418 U.S. 676), so the Court had not yet adjourned; however, the case must have been a very late addition to the calendar.
McCONNELL ET AL. v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL. (540 U.S. 93) was argued September 8, 2003, before the start of October Term 2003, but since it wasn’t decided until December 10, 2003, after the start of the 2003 term, it was considered part of that term.
It’s worth noting that, at the beginning of argument on September 8, Chief Justice Rehnquist said:
Today we'll break for lunch and reconvene at 1:30 and the
court will be in recess from today until the first Monday
in October 2003, at which time the October 2002 term of the
court will be adjourned and the October 2003 term of the court
will begin as provided by statute.
which makes it clear that October Term 2002 was still alive and well, eliminating the need for a special term. However, it created an odd result, with the case straddling two terms: argued in the 2002 term and decided in the 2003 term.